Abstract. We study the problem of finding an exact solution to the consensus halving problem. While recent work has shown that the approximate version of this problem is PPA-complete [28,27], we show that the exact version is much harder. Specifically, finding a solution with n cuts is FIXPhard, and deciding whether there exists a solution with fewer than n cuts is ETR-complete. We also give a QPTAS for the case where each agent's valuation is a polynomial. Along the way, we define a new complexity class BU, which captures all problems that can be reduced to solving an instance of the Borsuk-Ulam problem exactly. We show that FIXP ⊆ BU ⊆ TFETR and that LinearBU = PPA, where LinearBU is the subclass of BU in which the Borsuk-Ulam instance is specified by a linear arithmetic circuit.
Introduction
Dividing resources among agents in a fair manner is among the most fundamental problems in multi-agent systems [16] . Cake cutting [6, 8, 7, 15] , and rent division [14, 32, 24] are prominent examples of problems that lie in this category. At their core, each of these problems has a desired solution whose existence is usually proved via a theorem from algebraic topology such as Brouwer's fixed point theorem, Sperner's lemma, or Kakutani's fixed point theorem.
In this paper, we focus on a fair-division problem called consensus-halving: an object A represented by [0, 1] is to be divided into two halves A + and A − , so that n agents agree that A + and A − have the same value. Provided the agents have bounded and continuous valuations over A, this can always be achieved using at most n cuts, and this fact can be proved via the Borsuk-Ulam theorem from algebraic topology [45] . The necklace splitting and ham-sandwich problems are two other examples of fair-division problems for which the existence of a solution can be proved via the Borsuk-Ulam theorem [4, 5, 38] .
Recent work has further refined the complexity status of approximate consensus halving, in which we seek a division of the object so that every agent agrees that the values of A + and A − differ by at most . Since the problem always has a solution, it lies in TFNP, which is the class of function problems in NP that always have a solution. More recent work has shown that the problem is PPA-complete [28] , even for that is inverse-polynomial in n [27] . The problem of deciding whether there exists an approximate solution with k-cuts when k < n is NP-complete [26] . These results are particularly notable, because they identify consensus halving as one of the first natural PPA-complete problems.
While previous work has focused on approximate solutions to the problem, in this paper we study the complexity of solving the problem exactly. For problems in the complexity class PPAD, which is a subclass of both TFNP and PPA, prior work has found that there is a sharp contrast between exact and approximate solutions. For example, the Brouwer fixed point theorem is the theorem from algebraic topology that underpins PPAD. Finding an approximate Brouwer fixed point is PPAD-complete [38] , but finding an exact Brouwer fixed point is complete for (and the defining problem of) a complexity class called FIXP [25] .
It is believed that FIXP is significantly harder than PPAD. While PPAD ⊆ TFNP ⊆ FNP, there is significant doubt about whether FIXP ⊆ FNP. The reason for this is that there are Brouwer instances for which all solutions are irrational. This is not particularly relevant when we seek an approximate solution, but is a major difficulty when we seek an exact solution. For example, the square-root-sum problem asks us to decide for integers a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n , t, whether n i=1 √ a i ≤ t. This deceptively simple problem is not known to lie in NP, and can be reduced to the problem of finding an exact Brouwer fixed point [25] , which provides evidence that FIXP may be significantly harder than FNP.
Our contribution In this paper, we study the complexity of solving the consensus halving problem exactly. In our formulation of the problem, the valuation function of the agents is presented as an arbitrary arithmetic circuit, and the task is to cut A such that all agents agree that A + and A − have exactly the same valuation. We study two problems. The (n, n)-Consensus Halving problem asks us to find an exact solution for n-agents using at most n-cuts, while the (n, k)-Consensus Halving problem asks us to decide whether there exists an exact solution for n-agents using at most k-cuts, where k < n.
Our results for (n, n)-Consensus Halving are intertwined with a new complexity class that we call BU. This class consists of all problems that can be reduced in polynomial time to the problem of finding a solution of the Borsuk-Ulam problem. We show that (n, n)-Consensus Halving lies in BU, and is FIXP hard. The hardness for FIXP implies that the exact variant of consensus halving is significantly harder than the approximate variant: while the approximate problem is PPA-complete, the exact variant is unlikely to be in FNP.
We show that (n, k)-Consensus Halving is ETR-complete. The complexity class ETR consists of all decision problems that can be formulated in the existential theory of the reals. It is known that NP ⊆ ETR ⊆ PSPACE [17] , and it is generally believed that ETR is distinct from the other two classes. So our result again shows that the exact version of the problem seems to be much harder than the approximate version, which is NP-complete [26] .
Just as FIXP can be thought of as the exact analogue of PPAD, we believe that BU is the exact analogue of PPA, and we provide some evidence to justify this. It has been shown that LinearFIXP = PPAD [25] , which is the version of the class in which arithmetic circuits are restricted to produce piecewise linear functions (FIXP allows circuits to compute piecewise polynomials). We likewise define LinearBU, which consists of all problems that can be reduced to a solution of a Borsuk-Ulam problem using a piecewise linear function, and we show that LinearBU = PPA.
The containment LinearBU ⊆ PPA can be proved using similar techniques to the proof that LinearFIXP ⊆ PPAD. However, the proof that PPA ⊆ LinearBU utilises our BU containment result for consensus halving. In particular, when the input to the consensus halving problem is a piecewise linear function, our containment result shows that the problem actually lies in LinearBU. The PPA-hardness results for consensus halving show that piecewise-linear-consensus halving is PPA-hard, which completes the containment [28, 27] .
Finally, we show that, for the case where each agent has a (non-piecewise) polynomial valuation, an approximate solution to the problem can be found using O(log n) cuts, which then yields a QPTAS for the problem.
Related work Although for a long period there were a few results about PPA, recently there has been a flourish of PPA-completeness results. The first PPA-completeness result was given by [31] who showed PPA-completeness of the Sperner problem for a non-orientable 3-dimensional space. In [29] this result was strengthened for a non-orientable and locally 2-dimensional space. In [3] , 2-dimensional Tucker was shown to be PPA-complete; this result was used in [28, 27] to prove PPA-completeness for approximate consensus halving. In [22] PPA-completeness was proven for a special version of Tucker and for problems of the form "given a discrete fixed point in a non-orientable space, find another one". Finally, in [23] it was shown that octahedral Tucker is PPA-complete. In [36] , a subclass of 2DLinearFIXP ⊆ FIXP that consists of 2-dimensional fixed-point problems was studied, and it was proven that 2DLinearFIXP = PPAD.
A large number of problems are now known to be ETR-complete: geometric intersection problems [34, 40] , graph-drawing problems [1, 9, 18, 41] , matrix factorization problems [43, 44] , the Art Gallery problem [2] , and deciding the existence of constrained (symmetric) Nash equilibria in (symmetric) normal form games with at least three players [10, 11, 12, 13, 30] .
Preliminaries

Arithmetic circuits
An arithmetic circuit is a representation of a continuous function f : R n → R m . The circuit is defined by a pair (V, T ), where V is a set of nodes and T is a set of gates. There are n nodes in V that are designated to be input nodes, and m nodes in V that are designated to be output nodes. When a value x ∈ R n is presented at the input nodes, the circuit computes values for all other nodes v ∈ V , which we will denote as x [v] . The values of x [v] for the m output nodes determine the value of f (x) ∈ R m . Every node in V , other than the input nodes, is required to be the output of exactly one gate in T . Each gate g ∈ T enforces an arithmetic constraint on its output node, based on the values of some other node in the circuit. Cycles are not allowed in these constraints. We allow the operations {ζ, +, −, * ζ, * , max, min}, which correspond to the gates shown in Table 1 . Note that every gate computes a continuous function over its inputs, and thus any function f that is represented by an arithmetic circuit of this form is also continuous. We study two types of circuits in this paper. General arithmetic circuits are allowed to use any of the gates that we have defined above. Linear arithmetic circuits allow only the operations {ζ, +, −, * ζ, max, min}, and the * operation (multiplication of two variables) is disallowed. Observe that a linear arithmetic circuit computes a piecewise linear function.
The Consensus Halving problem
In the consensus halving problem there is an object A that is represented by the [0, 1] line segment, and there are n agents. We wish to divide A into two (not necessarily contiguous) pieces such that every agent agrees that the two pieces have equal value. Simmons and Su [45] have shown that, provided the agents have bounded and continuous valuations over A, then we can find a solution to this problem using at most n cuts.
In this paper we consider instances of the consensus halving problem where the valuations of the agents are presented as arithmetic circuits. Each agent has a valuation function f i : [0, 1] → R, but it is technically more convenient if they give us a representation of the integral of this function. So for each agent i, we are given an arithmetic circuit computing F i : [0, 1] → R where for all x ∈ [0, 1] we have
f (y) dy. Then, the value of any particular segment of [a, b] to agent i can be computed as
A solution to the consensus halving problem is given by a k-cut of the object A, which is defined by a vector of cut-points (t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t k ) ∈ [0, 1] k , and a vector of signs (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s k+1 ) ∈ {−1, +1} k+1 . The cut-points t i split A into up to k + 1 pieces. Note that they may in fact split A into fewer than k + 1 pieces in the case where two cut-points t i = t j overlap. We define X i to be the ith piece of A, meaning
The sign vector determines which half of A the piece belongs to. We define A + := {X i : s i = +1} and A − := {X i : s i = −1} to be the two halves. For each agent i, we denote the value A + to agent i as
, and we define F i (A − ) analogously. The k-cut is a solution to the consensus halving problem if
We define two computational problems. Simmons and Su [45] have proved that there always exists a solution using at most n-cuts, and our first problem is to find that solution.
(n, n)-Consensus Halving Input: For every agent i ∈ [n], an arithmetic circuit F i computing the integral of agent i's valuation function. Task: Find an n-cut for A such that
For k < n a solution to the problem may or may not exist. So we define the following decision variant of the problem.
(n, k)-Consensus Halving Input: For every agent i ∈ [n], an arithmetic circuit F i computing the integral of agent i's valuation function. Task: Decide whether there exists a k-cut for A such that
For either of these two problems, if all of the inputs are represented by linear arithmetic circuits, then we refer to the problem as Linear Consensus Halving. We note that the known hardness results [26, 28] for consensus halving fall into this class. Specifically, those results produce valuations that are piecewise constant, and so the integral of these functions is piecewise linear, and these functions can be written down as linear arithmetic circuits [37] .
The Class BU
The Borsuk-Ulam theorem states that every continuous function from the surface of an (d+1)-dimensional sphere to the d-dimensional Euclidean space maps at least one pair of antipodal points to the same point.
This theorem actually works for any domain D that is antipode-preserving homeomorphism of S d , where by "antipode-preserving" we mean that for every x ∈ D we have that −x ∈ D. In this paper, we choose S d to be the sphere in d + 1 dimensions with respect to L 1 norm:
We define the Borsuk-Ulam problem as follows.
Borsuk-Ulam
Input: A continuous function f :
Note that we cannot constrain an arithmetic circuit to only take inputs from the domain S d , so we instead put the constraint that x ∈ S d onto the solution. The complexity class BU is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (BU).
The complexity class BU consists of all search problems that can be reduced to Borsuk-Ulam in polynomial time.
LinearBU
When the input to a Borsuk-Ulam instance is a linear arithmetic circuit, then we call the problem Linear Borsuk-Ulam, and we define the class LinearBU as follows.
Definition 3 (LinearBU).
The complexity class LinearBU consists of all search problems that can be reduced to Linear Borsuk-Ulam in polynomial time.
We will show that LinearBU = PPA. The proof that LinearBU ⊆ PPA is similar to the proof that Etessami and Yannakakis used to show that LinearFIXP ⊆ PPAD [25] , while the fact that PPA ⊆ LinearBU will follow from our results on consensus halving in Section 4.
To prove LinearBU ⊆ PPA we will reduce to the approximate Borsuk-Ulam problem. It is well known that the Borsuk-Ulam theorem can be proved via Tucker's lemma, and Papadimitriou noted that this implies that finding an approximate solution to a Borsuk-Ulam problem lies in PPA [38] . This is indeed correct, but the proof provided in [38] is for a slightly different problem 3 . Since our results will depend on this fact, we provide our own definition and self-contained proof here. We define the approximate Borsuk-Ulam problem as follows.
-Borsuk-Ulam
Input: A continuous function f : R d+1 → R d presented as an arithmetic circuit, along with two constants , λ ∈ R. Task: Find one of the following.
The first type of solution is an approximate solution to the Borsuk-Ulam problem, while the second type of solution consists of any two points that witness that the function is not λ-Lipschitz continuous in the L ∞ -norm. The second type of solution is necessary, because an arithmetic circuit is capable, through repeated squaring, of computing doubly-exponentially large numbers, and the reduction to Tucker may not be able to find an approximate solution for such circuits. We now re-prove the result of Papadimitriou in the following lemma.
To show that LinearBU ⊆ PPA we will provide a polynomial time reduction from Linear Borsuk-Ulam to -Borsuk-Ulam. To do this, we follow closely the technique used by Etessami and Yannakakis to show that LinearFIXP ⊆ PPAD [25] . The idea is to make a single call to -Borsuk-Ulam to find an approximate solution to the problem for a suitably small , and to then round to an exact solution by solving a linear program. To build the LP, we depend on the fact that we have access to the linear arithmetic circuit that represents f .
Lemma 5. Linear Borsuk-Ulam is in PPA
The proofs of these two lemmata can be found in Appendix A and B respectively.
Containment Results for Consensus Halving
4.1 (n, n)-Consensus Halving is in BU and LinearBU = PPA We show that (n, n)-Consensus Halving is contained in BU. Simmons and Su [45] show the existence of an n-cut solution to the consensus halving problem by applying the Borsuk-Ulam theorem, and we follow their approach in this reduction. However, we must show that the approach can be implemented using arithmetic circuits. We take care in the reduction to avoid G * gates, and so if the inputs to the problem are all linear arithmetic circuits, then our reduction will produce a Linear Borsuk-Ulam instance. Hence, we also show that (n, n)-Linear Consensus Halving is in LinearBU. The proof can be found in Appendix C.
Theorem 6. The following two containments hold.
-(n, n)-Consensus Halving is in BU.
-(n, n)-Linear Consensus Halving is in LinearBU.
We note that this also implies that PPA ⊆ LinearBU, thereby completing the proof that PPA = LinearBU. Specifically, Filos-Ratsikas and Goldberg have shown that approximate-(n, n)-Consensus Halving is PPA-complete, and their valuation functions are piecewise constant. Therefore, the integrals of these functions are piecewise linear, and so their approximate-(n, n)-Consensus Halving instances can be reduced to (n, n)-Linear Consensus Halving. Hence (n, n)-Linear Consensus Halving is PPA-hard, which along with Lemma 5 implies the following corollary.
Corollary 7. PPA = LinearBU.
(n, k)-Consensus Halving is in ETR
The existential theory of the reals consists of all true existentially quantified formulae using the connectives {∧, ∨, ¬} over polynomials compared with the operators {<, ≤, =, ≥, >}. The complexity class ETR captures all problems that can be reduced in polynomial time to the existential theory of the reals.
We prove that (n, k)-Consensus Halving is in ETR. The reduction simply encodes the arithmetic circuits using ETR formulas, and then constrains F i (A + ) = F i (A − ) for every agent i. The proof can be found in Appendix D.
Theorem 8. (n, k)-Consensus Halving is in ETR.
Using the same technique, we can also reduce Borsuk-Ulam to an ETR formula. In this case, we get an ETR formula that always has a solution, and so this result places the problem in TFETR, which is the subclass of ETR in which the formula is guaranteed to be true. Theorem 9. BU ⊆ TFETR.
Hardness Results for Consensus Halving
In this section we prove that (n, n)-Consensus Halving is FIXP-hard and that (n, n − 1)-Consensus Halving is ETR-hard. These two reductions share a common step of embedding an arithmetic circuit into a consensus halving instance. So we first describe this step, and then move on to proving the two individual hardness results.
Embedding a circuit in a Consensus Halving instance
Our approach is inspired by [26] , who provided a reduction from -GCircuit [19, 39] to approximate consensus halving. However, our construction deviates significantly from theirs due to several reasons.
Firstly, the reduction in [26] works only for approximate consensus halving. Specifically, some valuations used in that construction have the form of 1/ , where is the approximation guarantee, so the construction is not well-defined when = 0 as it is in our case. Many of the gate gadgets used in [26] cannot be used due to this issue, including the max gate, which is crucially used in that construction to ensure that intermediate values do not get too large. We provide our own implementations of the broken gates. Our gate gadgets only work when the inputs and outputs lie in the range [0, 1], and so we must carefully construct circuits for which this is always the case. The second major difference is that the reduction in [26] does not provide any method of multiplying two variables, which is needed in our case. We construct a gadget to do this, based on a more primitive gadget for squaring a single variable. Special circuit Our reduction from an arithmetic circuit to consensus halving will use a very particular subset of gates. Specifically, we will not use G min , G max , or G * , and we will restrict G * ζ so that ζ must lie in (0, 1]. We do however introduce three new gates, shown in We note that G min , G max , and G * can be implemented in terms of our new gates according to the following identities.
Special Gate
Also, a very important requirement of the special circuit is that both inputs of any G + gate are in [0, 1/2]. To make sure of that, we downscale the inputs before reaching the gate, and upscale the output, using the fact that a + b = (a/2 + b/2) · 2.
The reduction to consensus halving The reduction follows the general outline of the reduction given in [26] . The construction is quite involved, and so we focus on the high-level picture here.
Each gate is implemented by 4 agents, namely ad, mid, cen, ex in the consensus halving instance. The values computed by the gates are encoded by the positions of the cuts that are required in order to satisfy these agents. Agent ad performs the exact mathematical operation of the gate, and feeds the outcome in mid, who "trims" it in accordance with the gate's actual operation. Then mid feeds her outcome to cen and ex, who make a copy of mid's correct value of the gate, with "negative" and "positive" labels respectively. This value with the appropriate label will be input to other gates.
The most important agents are the ones that perform the mathematical operation of each gate, i.e. agents ad. Figure 1 shows the part of the valuation functions of these agents that perform the operation. Each figure shows a valuation function for one of the agents, meaning that the blue regions represent portions of the object that the agent desires. The agent's valuation function for any particular interval is the integral of this function over that interval.
To understand the high-level picture of the construction, let us look at the construction for G * ζ . The precise valuation functions of the agents in the construction (see (1) in Appendix F.1) ensure that there is exactly one input cut in the region v + in . The leftmost piece due to that cut in that region will belong to A + , while the rightmost will belong to A − . It is also ensured that there is exactly one output cut in the region v a out , and that the first piece in that region will belong to A − and the second will belong to A + . Suppose that gate g i in the circuit is of type G * ζ and we want to implement it through a Consensus Halving instance. If we treat v + in and v a out in Figure 1 as representing [0, 1], then agent ad i will take as input a cut at point x ∈ v + in . In order to be satisfied, ad i will impose a cut at point y ∈ v a out , such that F i (A + ) = F i (A − ), where: F i (A + ) = x + (ζ − y)/ζ and F i (A − ) = (1 − x) + y/ζ. Simple algebraic manipulation can be used to show that ad i is satisfied only when y = ζ · x, as required.
We show that the same property holds for each of the gates in Figure 1 . Two notable constructions are for the gates G () 2 and G 
] is negative, then the output cut will lie before the output region, which will be interpreted as a zero output Valuation function by agents mid, cen, ex in the construction. On the other hand, if the result is positive, the result will lie in the usual output range, and will be interpreted as a positive number. An example where Figure 2 .
Ultimately, this allows us to construct a consensus-halving instance that implements this circuit. This means that for any x ∈ [0, 1] n , we can encode x as a set of cuts, which then force cuts to be made at each gate gadget that encode the correct output for that gate. The full details of the construction are quite involved, and so we defer them to Appendix F, where the following result is shown.
Lemma 10. Suppose that we are given an arithmetic circuit with the following properties.
-The circuit uses the gates
We can construct a consensus-halving instance that implements this circuit.
(n, n)-Consensus Halving is FIXP-hard
We show that (n, n)-Consensus Halving is FIXP-hard by reducing from the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in a d-player game, which is known to be a FIXP-complete [25] . As shown in [25] , this problem can be reduced to the Brouwer fixed point problem: given an arithmetic circuit computing a function
In a similar way to [26] , we take this circuit and embed it into a consensus halving instance, with the outputs looped back to the inputs. Since Lemma 10 implies that our implementation of the circuit is correct, this means that any solution to the consensus halving problem must encode a point x satisfying F (x) = x.
One difficulty is that we must ensure that the arithmetic circuit that we build falls into the class permitted by Lemma 10. To do this, we carefully analyse the circuits produced in [25] , and we modify them so that all of the preconditions of Lemma 10 hold. This gives us the following result, which is proved in Appendix G.
Theorem 11. (n, n)-Consensus Halving is FIXP-hard.
This theorem, along with Theorem 6 give the following corollary.
Corollary 12. FIXP ⊆ BU.
(n, n − 1)-Consensus Halving is ETR-complete
We will show the ETR-hardness of (n, n−1)-Consensus Halving by reducing from the following problem Feasible, which is known to be ETR-complete [42] .
n that satisfies p.
The idea is to turn the polynomial into a circuit, and then embed that circuit into a consensus halving instance using Lemma 10. As before, the main difficulty is ensuring that the preconditions of Lemma 10 are satisfied. To do this, we must ensure that the the inputs to the circuit take values in [0, 1], which is not the case if we reduce directly from Feasible. Instead, we first consider the problem Feasible [0, 1] , in which x is constrained to lie in [0, 1] n rather than R n , and we show the following result in Appendix H.2.
ETR [0, 1] is the subclass of ETR in which variables are quantified over [0, 1] n rather than R n . The above lemma follows from the fact that ETR [0,1] = ETR which we prove in Appendix H.1, and the fact that We then proceed to reduce Feasible [0,1] to (n, n−1)-Consensus Halving. We still don't quite meet the requirements of Lemma 10, because the intermediate terms may be outside [0, 1]. We resolve this by implementing a circuit p + (x) (called q 1 (x) in Appendix I) implementing only the positive terms of p(x) downscaled appropriately, and a circuit p − (x) (called q 2 (x) in Appendix I) implementing the positive terms of −p(x) again downscaled appropriately. The check agent is then satisfied if p + (x) = p − (x), which can only occur when p(x) = 0.
There will be n − 1 choice agents (the agents called ad, mid, cen, ex in Appendix F.1 with valuation functions shown in (1)) corresponding to the (n − 1)/4 nodes of the circuit, who enforce that there is a cut for each of the nodes to the circuit, and together these cuts encode an input x to the polynomial. Each agent introduced by Lemma 10 has an associated cut that is forced by the construction used in that lemma, and these cuts compute the output of the associated gate.
So far, every agent has a corresponding cut that is forced by the construction. There is, however, one final check agent (the agent called f inis in Appendix I) with valuation functions shown in (17)) who has the following properties.
-If p(x) = 0, then the check agent agrees that A has been cut in half without an extra cut being made.
-If p(x) = 0, then the check agent requires one more cut to be made in order to be satisfied that A has been cut in half.
Hence, if there exists a solution to Feasible, then there is a solution to Feasible [0, 1] , hence there is a (n − 1)-cut that solves the Consensus Halving instance, and otherwise there is no such solution. The details of this reduction are given in Appendix I, where the following result is shown.
Theorem 15. (n, n − 1)-Consensus Halving is ETR-complete.
A QPTAS for Consensus Halving with polynomial valuation functions
In this section we show that an approximate solution to the consensus halving problem can be found in quasi-polynomial time when each agent's valuation function is presented as a single polynomial of constant or logarithmic degree. We will do so by formulating the problem as a formula in the approximate existential theory of the reals, and then applying the approximation theorem proved in [20, 21] . Our result implies that these instances can be solved approximately using a logarithmic number of cuts. We note that this is one of the most general classes of instances for which we could hope to prove such a result: any instance in which n agents desire completely disjoint portions of the object can only be solved by an n-cut, and piecewise linear functions are capable of producing such a situation. So in a sense, we are exploiting the fact that this situation cannot arise when the agents have (non-piecewise) polynomial valuations. The proof of the following lemma can be found in Appendix J.
Lemma 16. For every Consensus Halving instance with n agents, and every > 0, if each agent's valuation function F i is represented as a single polynomial of degree at most O(log n), then there exists an O(log n)-cut and pieces A + and A − such that:
As a consequence, we can perform a brute force search over all possible O(log n)-cuts to find an approximate solution, which can be carried out in n O(log n/ 4 ) time.
Theorem 17. Consensus Halving admits a QPTAS when the valuation function of every agent is a single polynomial of degree O(log n).
A Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. This proof is essentially identical to the one given by Papadimitriou, but various minor changes must be made due to the fact that our input is an arithmetic circuit, and our domain is the L 1 -sphere. His proof works by reducing to the Tucker problem. In this problem we have a antipodally symmetric triangulation of S d with set of vertices V , and a labelling function L :
The task is to find two adjacent vertices v and u such that L(v) = −L(u), whose existence is guaranteed via Tucker's lemma. Papadimitriou's containment proof goes via the hypercube, but in [26] it is pointed out that this problem also lies in PPA when the domain is the L 1 -sphere S d . To reduce the -Borsuk-Ulam problem for (f, , λ) to Tucker, we choose an arbitrary triangulation of S n such that the distance between any two adjacent vertices is at most /λ. Let g(x) = f (x) − f (−x). To determine the label of a vertex v ∈ V , first find the coordinate i that maximises |g(v) i | breaking ties arbitrarily, and then set
Tucker's lemma will give us two adjacent vertices v and u satisfying L(v) = −L(u), and we must translate this to a solution to -Borsuk-Ulam.
we have a violation of Lipschitz continuity. Otherwise, we have
for all j, and that that g(u) i and g(v) i have opposite signs. These three facts, along with the fact that
B Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. Suppose that we have a function f that is represented as a linear arithmetic circuit. We will provide a polynomial time reduction to -Borsuk-Ulam. The first step is to argue that, for all > 0, we can make a single call to -Borsuk-Ulam in order to find an -approximate solution to the problem. The only technicality here is that we must choose λ so as to ensure that no violations of λ-Lipschitzness in the L ∞ -norm can be produced as a solution.
Fortunately, every linear arithmetic circuit computes a λ-Lipschitz function where the bit-length of λ is polynomial in the size of the circuit. Moreover, an upper bound on λ can easily be computed by inspecting the circuit.
-An input to the circuit has a Lipschitz constant of 1.
-A + gate operating on two gates with Lipschitz constants x and y has a Lipschitz constant of at most x + y. -A * ζ gate operating on a gate with Lipschitz constant x has a Lipschitz constant of at most |ζ| · x. -A max or min gate operating on two gates with Lipschitz constants x and y has a Lipschitz constant of at most max(x, y).
The Lipschitz constant for the circuit in the L ∞ -norm is then the maximum of the Lipschitz constants of the output nodes of the circuit. So, for any given > 0 that can be represented in polynomially many bits, we can make a single call to -Borsuk-Ulam, in order to find an -approximate solution to the Borsuk-Ulam problem. The second step is to choose an appropriate value for so that the approximate solution can be rounded to an exact solution using an LP. Let g(x) = f (x) − f (−x). Note that g(x) can also be computed by a linear arithmetic circuit, and that g(x) = 0 if and only if f (x) = f (−x).
We closely follow the approach of Etessami and Yannakakis [25] . They use the fact that the function computed by a linear arithmetic circuit is piecewise-linear, and defined by (potentially exponentially many) hyperplanes. They give an algorithm that, given a point p in the domain of the circuit, computes in polynomial time the hyperplane that defines the output of the circuit for p. Furthermore, they show that the following can be produced in polynomial time from the representation of the circuit and from p.
-A system of linear constraints Ax ≤ b such that a point x satisfies the constraints if and only if the hyperplane that defines the output of the circuit for p also defines the output of the circuit for x. -A linear formula Cx + C that determines the output of the circuit for all points that satisfy Ax ≤ b.
To choose , the following procedure is used. Let n be the number of inputs to g, and let m be an upper bound on the bit-size of the solution of any linear system with n + 1 equations where the coefficients are drawn from the hyperplanes that define the function computed by g. This can be computed in polynomial time from the description of the circuit, and m will have polynomial size in relation to the description of the circuit. We choose < 1/2 m . We make one call to -Borsuk-Ulam to find a point p ∈ S n such that f (p) − f (−p) ∞ ≤ , meaning that g(p) ∞ ≤ . The final step is to round this to an exact solution of Borsuk-Ulam. To do this, we can modify the linear program used by Etessami and Yannakakis [25] . We apply the operations given above to the circuit g and the point p to obtain the system of constraints Ax ≤ b and the formula Cx + C for the hyperplane defining the output of g for p. We then solve the following linear program. The variables of the LP are a vector x of length n, and a scalar z. The goal is to minimize z subject to:
The first constraint ensures that we remain on the same hyperplane as the one defining the output of g for p. The second and third constraints ensure that g(x) ∞ ≤ z. The fourth and fifth constraints ensure that x i has the same sign as p i , while the sixth constraint ensures that x lies on the surface S n . Note that the |x i | operation in the sixth constraint is not a problem, since the fourth and fifth constraints mean that we know the sign of x i up front, and so we just need to add either x i or −x i to the sum. All of the above implies that that x is a z-approximate solution of Borsuk-Ulam for f .
We must now argue that the solution sets z = 0. First we note that the LP has a solution, because the point (p, ) is feasible, and the LP is not unbounded since z cannot be less than zero due to the second and third constraints. So let (x * , z * ) be an optimal solution. This solution lies at the intersection of n + 1 linear constraints defined by rationals drawn from the circuit representing g, and so it follows that z * is a rational of bit length at most m. Since 0 ≤ z * ≤ < 1/2 m , it follows that z * = 0, and thus x * is an exact solution to Borsuk-Ulam for f .
C Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. Let us first summarise the approach used by Simmons and Su [45] . Given valuation functions F i for the n agents, they construct a Borsuk-Ulam instance given by a function b : S n → R n . Each point (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n+1 ) ∈ S n can be interpreted as an n-cut of [0, 1], where |x i | gives the width of the ith piece, and the sign of x i indicates whether the ith piece should belong in A + or A − . They then define b(x) i = F i (A + ) for each agent i. The fact that −x flips the sign of each piece, but not the width, implies that b(−x) i = F i (A − ). Hence, any point that satisfies b(x) = b(−x) has the property that
for all agents i, and so is a solution to the consensus halving property.
Our task is to implement this reduction using arithmetic circuits. Suppose that we are given arithmetic circuits F i implementing the integral of each agent's valuation function. Given a point (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n+1 ) ∈ S n , we show that b(x) i = F i (A + ) can be computed via a linear arithmetic circuit. The tricky part of this, is that we must only include the ith piece in the sum if x i is positive.
We begin by observing that the operation of |x| can be implemented via a linear arithmetic circuit. Specifically, via the following construction:
|x| := max(x, 0) + max(−x, 0).
Hence, we can implement |x| using only max, plus, and constant gates. Then, we define t 1 := 0, and for each j in the range 2 ≤ j ≤ n, define:
The value of t j gives the start of the jth piece. Next, for each j in the range 1 ≤ j ≤ n we define:
Note that p j is x j whenever x j is positive, and zero otherwise. Finally, define:
Using the reasoning above, we can see that q j is agent i's valuation for piece j whenever x j is positive, and zero otherwise. So we can define
To complete the proof, it suffices to note that none of the operations specified above use the gate G * , and so if each F i is specified by a linear arithmetic circuit, then b will also be a linear arithmetic circuit.
D Proof of Theorem 8
Proof. The first step is to argue that an arithmetic circuit can be implemented as an ETR formula. Let (V, T ) be the arithmetic circuit. For every vertex v ∈ V we introduce a new variable x v . For every gate g ∈ T we introduce a constraint. For the gates in the set {G ζ , G + , G − , G * ζ , G * } the constraints simply implement the gate directly, eg., for a gate
and likewise for a gate G min (v in1 , v in2 , v out ) we use the formula
Taking the conjunction of the constraints for each of the gates yields an ETR formula that implements the circuit. Now we perform the reduction from consensus halving to the existential theory of the reals. Suppose that we have been given, for each agent i, an arithmetic circuit F i implementing the integral of agent i's valuation function. We have already shown in the proof of Theorem 6 that, given a description of a k-cut given as a point in S k , we can create a circuit implementing F i (A + ) and a circuit implementing F i (A − ) for each agent i. We also argued in that proof that k+1 j=1 |x j | can be implemented as an arithmetic circuit. Our ETR formula is as follows.
The first set of constraints ensure that x is a solution to the consensus halving problem, and the final constraint ensures that x ∈ S n .
E Proof of Theorem 9
Proof. The proof is essentially identical to the proof of Theorem 8, and the only difference is that instead of starting with a consensus-halving instance, we start with an arbitrary arithmetic circuit representing the function f : S d → R d , for which we wish to find a point x satisfying f (x) = f (−x). We implement the arithmetic circuit in the same way as in Theorem 8, and our ETR formula is: are shown in Table 2 . In general, the input of H is a N -dimensional vector x ∈ [0, 1] N is given by N nodes with in-degree 0 and out-degree 1, called input-nodes. Also, in general, the output of H is a M -dimensional vector
M (the dimension of the circuit's output is of no importance here). Moreover, it could be the case that H is cyclic, meaning that it has no input and no output, but here we will consider the general case. Without loss of generality, let the rest of the nodes be of in-degree 1 and out-degree 1, located right after each gate's output. By "right after" we mean that if a gate's output has a branching, the node is placed before the branching. Suppose that the total number of nodes in H is r := N + |T | = poly(N ), since by definition H has polynomial size.
If the node v i ∈ V for i ∈ [r] is at the output of gate g i we will call it the output-node of g i (otherwise it will be an input-node). For an example see Figure 3 . Fig. 3 . Before (leftmost figure) and after (rightmost figure) the creation of a node in series with the output of an addition gate. v is the output-node of g.
Consider the node v i , the output-node of gate g i . v i corresponds to 4 consensus halving agents, named ad i , mid i , cen i and ex i . Player ad i (Latin for "to") represents the incoming edge to node v i and agent ex i (Latin for "from") the outgoing edge from v i , while both mid i and cen i represent an edge at the middle (center ) of node v i that connects its input and output. The number of agents created in H is n := 4r. The domain of the valuation functions of the agents is [0, 12r]. Furthermore, this interval is split to r blocks, with the i-th block being
According to the definition of the Consensus Halving problem, the domain of the valuation functions of the agents is [0, 1]. Although the domain of the valuation functions of the Consensus Halving instance that we reduce to is [0, 12r], this is just for convenience of presentation. In fact, by scaling down each block to length 1/(12r) (divide by 12r), the domain becomes [0, 1] and the correctness of the reduction is preserved.
Let us define the function border i (t), t ∈ [0, 12r] for each node v i , i ∈ [r]. The idea for this function is from [26] .
and also: Figure  1) .
The valuation functions of the agents ad i , mid i , cen i and ex i corresponding to node v i are,
if v i is input-node (input of H).
(1)
The intuition for the synergy of the 4 agents is the following: Take as a given that in a solution of the created Consensus Halving instance with at most n cuts, a cut is placed only (almost always) in the intervals v − , in this step mid i caps the value at 0), and feeds it in cen i via creating a cut in v m i . This correct value should be exported for further use from other gates to which v i is input, but depending on these gates, the positive or negative of that value might be needed (by "positive" and "negative" we mean the label, not the actual sign of the value). That is why a negative version of this value is produced by cen i and a positive by ex i , via a cut in v − i and v + i respectively. A negative(resp. positive) value is one encoded by a cut that defines an interval at its left which is negative(resp positive). Moreover, for every input-node v j we arbitrarily consider ad j to encode a negative value, and since (by the structure of the Consensus Halving instance) the labels of the values induced by the 4 agents are alternating, always cen i (resp. ex i ) encodes a negative(resp. positive) value.
F.2 1-1 correspondence of circuit values to Consensus Halving cuts
Let us define the functions z i (x), i ∈ [r] that depend on the input vector x ∈ [0, 1] N , and compute the value of each node v i of the arithmetic circuit H. Let us also arbitrarily set (z 1 , . . . , z N ) := (x 1 , . . . , x N ). First, we will show that for every tuple (z 1 (x), . . . , z r (x)) of values that satisfy H, a solution in the constructed Consensus Halving instance with n agents and n cuts (n := 4r) encodes the same values via its cuts. We will then show that for every solution of the Consensus Halving instance with n agents and n cuts, the cuts correspond to a unique tuple (z 1 , . . . , z r ) that satisfies H. In the sequel, we call a cut t negative(resp. positive) if the interval that it defines at its left has negative(resp. positive) label. Without loss of generality, let the interval at the left of the first cut to be a negative interval.
Circuit values to cuts Suppose the tuple (z * 1 , . . . , z * r ) satisfies H. We will show that from this solution we can create a Consensus Halving solution with n := 4r cuts, i.e. all of the agents are satisfied. Consider node v i of H. Let us translate the values z * i , i ∈ [r] into cuts as follows:
or v i is an input-node.
• Place a cut at t = v
By construction of the valuation functions of the agents, these cuts are placed one after the other, and therefore they alternate between "negative" and "positive", starting with negative. Let us now prove that for every i ∈ [r], the ad i agent is satisfied. (1)), therefore, in order for ad i to be satisfied, it suffices that
ζ , which is true. 1) ), therefore, in order for ad i to be satisfied, it suffices that z *
2 and its output-node v i . By our constructed n-cut, a positive cut is placed at t = v (1)), therefore, in order for ad i to be satisfied, it suffices that
: Consider its input z * j , output z * i = 2 · z * j and its output-node v i . By our constructed n-cut, a positive cut is placed at t = v (1)), therefore, in order for ad i to be satisfied, it suffices that
, which is true.
: Consider its inputs z * j , z * k , its output z * i = max{z * j − z * k , 0} and its output-node v i . By our constructed n-cut,
By our constructed n-cut, a positive cut is placed at t = v + j,l + z * j , a negative cut is placed at t = v − k,l + z * k and another negative cut is placed at t = v a i,l + z * i . In order for ad i to be satisfied, it suffices that z *
By our constructed n-cut, a positive cut is placed at t = v + j,l +z * j , a negative cut is placed at t = v − k,l + z * k and another negative cut is placed at t = v a i,l − (z * k − z * j )/5. In order for ad i to be satisfied, it suffices that z *
)·(4+1), which is true.
We will now prove that in our constructed n-cut, the agents mid i , cen i , ex i are also satisfied. If g i is not a G 
, which is true. The proof of satisfaction of agents mid i , cen i , ex i is similar, since the succeeding agent's valuation function is the same as the preceding agent's one, shifted 3 units.
If
gate, let us prove that mid i is satisfied.
-if z * j ≥ z * k , then a negative cut is placed at t = v a i,l + z * i , and a positive cut is placed at t = v m i,l + z * i . In order for mid i to be satisfied, it suffices that z * In order for mid i to be satisfied, it suffices that
For the agents cen i and ex i , it is easy to see that due to their valuation functions, the n-cut we provide forces them to have positive total valuation equal to the negative one.
Cuts to circuit values Now suppose that the tuple (t * 1 , . . . , t * n ) with 0 ≤ t * 1 ≤ · · · ≤ t * n ≤ 12r, represents an n-cut (n := 4r) that is a solution of the constructed Consensus Halving instance with n agents, where w.l.o.g. the first 4N cuts correspond to the N input-nodes. We will show that from this solution we can construct a tuple (z 1 , . . . , z r ) that satisfies the circuit H.
Consider node v i which is the output-node of gate g i or it is an input-node. Observe that the valuation function of each of ad i , mid i , cen i and ex i has more than half of her total valuation inside the interval
respectively. This means that in a solution, each of them has to have at least one cut in her corresponding aforementioned interval. But since these intervals are not overlapping for all n agents, and we need to have at most n cuts, exactly one cut has to be placed by each agent in her corresponding interval.
Consider now the first 4N cuts that correspond to the input-nodes. As it is apparent from the definition of these nodes' valuation functions, each agent of ad i , mid i , cen i , ex i for i ∈ [N ] has to place her single cut in the interval v 
Valuation functions to circuits
In the Consensus Halving instances we construct, we have described the valuation functions of the agents mathematically. However, in a Consensus Halving instance the input is an arithmetic circuit, therefore we have to turn each valuation function of each agent j ∈ [n] into an arithmetic circuit. Here we describe a method to do that.
These functions, as we showed, are piecewise linear, or piecewise quadratic, with k pieces, where k is constant. Consider the valuation function f of an arbitrary player. Let the pieces of f be
where p 0 = 0 and p k = 1 and denote P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P k the above pieces respectively. Let us also denote by f Ps the polynomial in interval P s , s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}. In particular, f can be defined as
where f Ps (t) equals either a constant c s ≥ 0, or it equals c s · (t − p s−1 ). (The latter comes from the valuation function of an ad agent that corresponds to an output node of a G () 2 gate.)
For each of these pieces let us find the interval of f Ps (t), and denote it by F Ps (t), i.e. -If f Ps (t) = c s and f Ps+1 (t) = c s+1 :
Ps (t) = c s · (t − p s−1 ) then, by construction of our Consensus Halving instance, f Ps−1 (t) = c s−1 and f Ps+1 (t) = c s+1 , and:
For each player with some function f as defined above, we can compute the functions F Ps , s ∈ [k] by using gates G ζ , G + , G − , G * of an arithmetic circuit. Then, by checking the above cases, we can construct the function W k (t), t ∈ [0, 12r] that computes the cumulative value of the player at point t, by using G max and G min gates. Therefore, the arithmetic circuits of the functions W k (t) (one for each agent j ∈ [n]) constitute a proper Consensus Halving instance.
G Proof of Theorem 11
In [25] it is shown that the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium of a d-player normal form game with d ≥ 3 ("d-player Nash equilibrium" problem) is FIXP-complete. Given an instance of this problem, we will construct a polynomial-time reduction to (n, n)-Consensus Halving. We will start from an arbitrary instance of "d-player Nash equilibrium" and, according to it, design a circuit using only the gates G ζ , G + , G − , G * , G max , G min with ζ ∈ Q. This step is done by a straightforward application of the procedure described in the proofs of Lemma 4.5 and Lemma 4.6 in [25] . This circuit computes a function whose fixed points correspond precisely to the Nash equilibria of the initial game. Then, we create an equivalent circuit by "breaking down" the initial gates to some more suitable ones (by introducing "special gates", see Table 2 ), whose inputs and outputs are guaranteed to be in [0, 1] . From this, we will create a cyclic circuit, introduce consensus halving players on the "wires" of the circuit, and show that a consensus halving solution with at most as many cuts as the number of players in this instance can be efficiently translated back to a Nash equilibrium of the initial game.
G.1 Expressing the game as a circuit without division gates
Here, given an arbitrary d-player game, we will create a function whose fixed points are precisely the Nash equilibria of that game. Consider a given instance I of the "d-player Nash equilibrium" problem, i.e. a d-player normal form game where each player i has a set S i of pure strategies. We will use the following notation similar to the one in [25] , x 1N1 , x 21 , . . . , x 2N2 , . . . , x d1 , . . . , x dN d ) to be a N -dimensional vector with the entry x ij being the probability that player i ∈ [d] plays pure strategy j ∈ S i . Also, v(x) is an N -dimensional vector with entries indexed as in x, with v ij (x) := v i (j, x −i ), the latter being the expected payoff of player i when she plays the pure strategy j ∈ S i against the partial profile x −i of the rest of the players. The payoff function of each player is normalized by a standard scaling in [0, 1] so that the Nash equilibria of the game are precisely the same. Thus,
Now, define for each player i the function f i,x (t) := j∈Si max(h ij (x) − t, 0) with parameter x. This function is defined in R and it is continuous, piecewise linear, strictly decreasing with values from 0 to +∞, thus there is a unique value t i ∈ R such that f i,x (t i ) = 1. The required function whose set of fixed points is identical to the set of Nash equilibria of instance I is G I (x) ij := max(h ij (x) − t i , 0) for i ∈ [d], j ∈ S i . The function G I takes as input the n-dimensional vector x and outputs an N -dimensional vector G I (x) with entries defined as above. By definition of G I and choice of t i , it is j∈Si G I (x) ij = 1 for every i ∈ [d], and therefore G I is a mapping of the domain D I to itself.
Lemma 18 (LEMMA 4.5, [25] ). The fixed points of the function G I are precisely the Nash equilibria of the game I.
In fact, the structure of function G I allows for it to be efficiently constructed using only the required types of gates.
Lemma 19 (LEMMA 4.6, [25] ). We can construct in polynomial time a circuit with basis {+, −, * , max, min} (no division) and rational constants that computes the function G I .
For the proofs of the above lemmata the reader is referred to the indicated work by Etessami and Yannakakis.
In the proof of the latter lemma in [25] it is shown how to construct an arithmetic circuit C I that computes the function G I using only gates of type G ζ , G + , G − , G * , G max , G min , where ζ ∈ Q. The construction of C I is the following: Compute the function y = h(x) = x + v(x) using only G + , G * type of gates, allowed by the definition of v(x). Vector y has d sub-vectors, where y i = (y i1 , y i2 , . . . , y iNi ). Then, each y i is sorted using a sorting network Z i thus creating a vector z i = (z i1 , z i2 , . . . , z iNi ) with sorted entries z i1 ≥ z i2 ≥ · · · ≥ z iNi ; sorting networks can be implemented in arithmetic circuits using only gates G max , G min (for more see e.g. [33] ). Using z ij 's the function t i := max l∈ [Ni] (1/l) * l j=1 z ij − 1 is computed and the final output of the whole circuit is
G.2 A circuit with gates whose inputs/outputs are in [0, 1]
One can easily observe that some of the gates of circuit C I may have inputs and outputs outside of [0, 1]. For example, the G + gate that computes y ij = x ij + v(x) ij can be 2 and the arguments of G max in t i can be negative. We will transform this circuit into an equivalent one that guarantees its gates' inputs and outputs to be in [0, 1], using only gates
is a special subtraction gate that outputs 0 in case the subtraction results to a negative number, and
is a special multiplication gate that multiplies a single input in [0, . In particular, instead of constructing the circuit C I as described in the previous paragraph, we will construct an equivalent one, called C I , whose input and output are the same as that of C I , namely x ij and
respectively, but its gates have inputs/outputs in [0, 1]. We do this by manipulating the formula for the required function G I under computation, by suitably scaling up or down the input values of each gate, using additional gates
We construct C I as follows: First, we compute the vector p :
. Then, we sort each of the sub-vectors p i , i ∈ [d] via a sorting network Q i that can be constructed using G max and G min gates, thus computing the sorted vectors q i = (q i1 , q i2 , . . . , q iNi ) with sorted entries q i1 ≥ q i2 ≥ · · · ≥ q iNi . Now, for every i ∈ [d] and l ∈ [N i ] we compute the following sub-function
by using l + 1 G + gates, 3 G + gates and 1 G . Moreover, in the subtraction, the value of the subtrahend is at most the value of the minuend so the subtraction is precise (not capped at 0). Now, for each i ∈ [d] we compute the sub-function
by using N i − 1 G max gates, and consequently compute
by using one G and one special G [0,1] * 2 gate and the computations happen from left to right. Note that t i ≥ 1/2, therefore the subtraction is precise (not capped at 0). Also, note that, by definition of t il , it is t i ≤ 1, therefore t i − 1/2 ≤ 1/2 and the output of the G
gate of t i is in [0, 1]. Finally, the output of the circuit C I is computed by
using one G gate.
Lemma 20. Circuit C I is equivalent to C I , i.e. it computes the function G I .
Proof. We will show that for every i ∈ [d], j ∈ S i , the value x ij of (4) is the same as that of (3), i.e. the output of the circuits C I and C I is the exact same. Using the formulas for t il , t i and t i , we can re-write algebraically x ij by substituting the circuit's operations with the regular mathematical ones, i.e. G + , G gate, excluding the one in (4), actually performs subtraction without capping the output to 0. Thus, starting from (4) we have
which is by definition equal to the output x ij of (3).
The circuit C I we constructed that computes the function G I uses gates of type in the set
G.3 The (n, n)-Consensus Halving instance
At this point we are ready to construct the (n, n)-Consensus Halving instance. The final circuit C I computes the function G I , where G I : D I → D I , whose fixed points are precisely the Nash equilibria of the initial instance I of the d-player game, due to Lemma 18. The output of C I is the N -dimensional vector x with entries x ij computed from (4). Let us close the circuit by connecting the output x ij with the input x ij for every i ∈ [d], j ∈ S i . This new circuit, called C o I , is cyclic, meaning that it has no input and no output.
The cyclic circuit As it was shown in Lemma 20, the output of C I computes the same output as C I , which computes the function G I . Thus, for x * it holds that G I (x * ) = x * , i.e. it is a fixed point of G I . Recall now that the fixed points of G I are precisely the Nash equilibria of instance I of the initial "d-player Nash equilibrium" problem. Since, due to [25] , "d-player Nash equilibrium" is FIXP-complete, it follows that (n, n)-Consensus Halving is FIXP-hard.
H Proof of Lemma 14
Let us define the constrained version of ETR, denoted ETR [0, 1] , where the polynomials are over [0, 1] n (while in ETR they are over R n ). It is easy to see that
where Φ is the ETR [0, 1] formula, can be written as the following ETR instance n → R be a family of polynomials, where each one of them is given as a sum of monomials with integer coefficients. Conjuction [0, 1] asks whether the polynomials have a common zero.
Suppose we are asked to decide an arbitrary instance (∃X ∈ R n ) (p(X) = 0) of Feasible. We wish to map every X ∈ R n to a Y ∈ [0, 1] n so that there is a solution Y * ∈ [0, 1] n if and only if there exists a solution X * ∈ R n . To this end, we will need the following result by Schaefer and Štefanckovič [42] . We borrow their terminology and by (bit-)complexity of a semi-algebraic set we call the shortest length of any formula defining the set. we will use the linear function
in order to scale the solutions of p(X) in [0, 1] n , (see Figure 4) . First, we need to create the number 2 L+5 . These numbers have exponential in the input bit-representation, that is why we will use the trick of "repeated squaring" to create the required number by introducing auxiliary variables which we repeatedly square L + 5 times. Since we need our variables to be in [0, 1], we will create the number 2
−2
L+5 , and we do this by introducing the variables S 1 , . . . , S L+6 and including the following conjunctions in our formula:
Now, using (5), we have Eventually, the instance of the problem Conjuction [0,1] that we create is
where we denote by S the tuple (S 1 , . . . , S L+6 ) and L is the total complexity of the initial Feasible instance. Note that the above instance has a solution if and only if the initial instance of Feasible has one. In fact, the stronger property holds that we can get any solution X from a solution Y in polynomial time, through (5), although this property is not necessary for our reduction since we are dealing with "yes/no problems". Also, note that the complexity of the new formula is at most 
where Φ is a boolean formula with atoms
is a polynomial function of X 1 , . . . , X n written in the standard form (a sum of monomials with integer coefficients) and ∈ {≤, >}. This is without loss of generality, since we can turn every equality to a conjunction of two inequalities, and also, we can always move all monomials of an inequality to the left or right side appropriately. The formula Φ consists of atoms Φ i , i ∈ [m] connected with ∧, ∨ and ¬. Let us transform Φ in polynomial time into its equivalent one without ¬, by employing De Morgan's laws, and thus the negation of an "≤-inequality" becomes an ">-inequality" and vice versa. As a first step, we would like to eliminate all the ≤ and > symbols, so that our formula contains only atoms with =.
Consider an arbitrary atom f i ≤ 0. For brevity, in the following we will denote (X 1 , . . . , X n ) by X and always imply that f i depends on X. The sentence
is equivalent to the following,
where an additional variable R i is introduced. In an ETR formula division is not allowed, so in order to eliminate the division operation, we further transform (7) to the equivalent
where allowing R i = 1 still does not allow f i > 0, since (8) has no solution for R i = 1. Now, consider an arbitrary atom f i > 0 of complexity L, i.e. the sentence
We will use the following result by Schaefer and Štefankovič. We remind that by (bit-)complexity of a semi-algebraic set we call the shortest length of any formula defining the set.
Proposition 24 ([42]
). If two semi-algebraic sets in R n each of complexity at most L ≥ 5n have positive distance (for example, if they are disjoint and compact), then that distance is at least 2
According to the above Proposition, sentence (9) is equivalent to the following,
where, since the bit-length of 2
−2
L+5 is exponential, we can create it using the "repeated squaring" trick.
That is we introduce L + 6 more variables S 1 , . . . , S L+6 ∈ [0, 1] whose tuple we denote by S and add the following conjunction of atoms in the formula:
Then, (10) is equivalent to
which we know how to transform to an equality (see (8) ). Therefore, by introducing a variable T i , (11) is equivalent to,
Now our boolean formula consists of m atoms that are polynomials equal to 0. We will proceed using the arsenal introduced in [35] where they prove a similar result for the unconstrained ETR case. First, let us introduce an additional "boolean" variable W i , i ∈ [m], one for each atom, with value 1 if the atom initially had ≤, and 0 if the atom initially had >. That is, for an arbitrary atom i, one of (8) or (12) is true. So, we can add in our formula the following sub-formula and the conjunction of them for every i ∈ [m]:
Next, we will eliminate the ∨ and ∧ operators using the following trick: (p = 0) ∨ (q = 0) is equivalent to p · q = 0 and (p = 0) ∧ (q = 0) is equivalent to p 2 + q 2 = 0. We will start from the latter conjunction of sub-formulas. For every sub-formula i ∈ [m], as in (13), we have a single polynomial h i = 0, where
thus replacing the conjunction of sub-formulas as in (13) with m i=1 (h i = 0). Note that we have not squared (1 − W i ) and W i because we know they are in [0, 1]. Now, let us substitute the initial formula Φ (after removing the ¬ operators) with its equivalent, using W i 's. That is, if the i-th atom of the initial formula is a "≤-inequality" we substitute it with the atom (1 − W i = 0), and if it is a ">-inequality" we substitute it with the atom (W i = 0). Therefore, we can now apply the aforementioned trick of multiplication to eliminate the ∨ operators and thus have a formula with just ∧, i.e.
where m ≤ m is the number of atoms in the resulting formula that represents Φ.
The whole formula, that is, together with the sub-formulas for the "boolean" variables is
What is left is to transform this into a single polynomial using the trick of sum of squares (squares are not needed for g i 's because our polynomials are in [0,1]),
Let us denote by W the tuple of "boolean variables" (W 1 , . . . , W m ) ∈ [0, 1] m , and similarly, R :
Then the existential sentence that we have to decide is
where L is the maximum complexity of an ">-inequality" in Φ. Since the number of atoms m of Φ is at most twice the total complexity L of Φ (because we substituted each equation with two inequalities), the number of variables is O(L ). Also, since m ≤ m and the complexity of h i is at most 8 · 16 = 128 times the complexity of the i-th atom in Φ, the complexity of the resulting formula of
We have proven that the formulas (6) and (14) 
I Proof of Theorem 15
As we show in Theorem 8, (n, k)-Consensus Halving is in ETR. In this section we prove that (n, n − 1)-Consensus Halving is ETR-hard, implying that it is complete for ETR. This extends the results of [26] , where it was established that (n, n − 1)-Consensus Halving is NP-hard even when a solution is required to be 1/poly(n)-approximately correct, i.e. it allows that |F i (A + ) − F i (A − )| ≤ for every agent i, where = 1/poly(n).
We present a polynomial time reduction from the ETR-complete problem Feasible [0,1] to (n, n − 1)-Consensus Halving. Suppose we are asked to decide an arbitrary instance of Feasible [0, 1] , i.e. the existential sentence
where X := (X 1 , . . . , X N ) ∈ [0, 1] N and p, is a polynomial function of X 1 , . . . , X N written in the standard form (a sum of monomials with integer coefficients). Consider the positive integer coefficients C 1 , . . . , C l of p, where the number of terms of the polynomial is l. These coefficients are positive without loss of generality, since we can replace a negative coefficient C that follows after a +(−) in the polynomial, with −C that follows a −(+). Also, let us normalize the coefficients and create new ones c 1 , . . . , c l , where
where C max := max j C j . Note that our new polynomial q(X) which uses the new coefficients has exactly the same roots as p(X). Also, note that c j ∈ (0,
, a fact that will play an important role at the last steps of our reduction. Now, let us split polynomial q into two polynomials q 1 and q 2 , such that
and both q 1 and q 2 are sums of positive terms; l 1 and l 2 terms of q 1 and q 2 respectively, where l = l 1 + l 2 .
In particular,
where
The circuit that computes these polynomials is presented in Figure 5 .
At this point we are ready to prove Theorem 15.
Proof. Let us construct a (n, n − 1)-Consensus Halving instance, where n is to be defined later. In Subsection 5.1 we have shown how to construct an equivalent circuit to the one that computes q 1 , q 2 , called "special circuit", that
5. An example of the circuit that computes q1 and q2. Each G * gate that multiplies two variable inputs is replaced by the structure shown in Figure 6 . Fig. 6 . The internal components of G * (see Subsection 5.1 for the mathematical formula that prescribes this transformation). Fig. 7 . The last two nodes of the special circuit.
-uses only gates For the constraints of the above types of gates, see Tables 1, 2 . Let the number of gates in that special circuit be r := poly(N ). Consider the last two nodes of the special circuit whose outgoing edges are q 1 and q 2 respectively. Without loss of generality, we name them v r−1 and v r (see Figure 7) .
By Lemma 10 and the construction described in its proof (Appendix F), we embed the special circuit in a Consensus Halving instance. This instance now consists of 4r agents, since to each node i ∈ [r] correspond 4 agents: ad i , mid i , cen i and ex i with valuation functions described by (1) .
According to the embedding described in Appendix F, a tuple (z * 1 , . . . , z * r ) of values that satisfies the special circuit, corresponds to a (4r, 4r)-Consensus Halving solution, i.e. a tuple (t * 1 , . . . , t * 4r ) with 0 ≤ t * 1 ≤ · · · ≤ t * 4r ≤ 12r, of the Consensus Halving instance we constructed, and vice versa. As shown in detail in Appendix F, a circuit every value z * i in a solution can be translated to 4 cuts t * 
Eventually, the number of agents in the embedding is n := 4r + 1.
We will show that the answer to the arbitrary Feasible [0, 1] instance (15) is "yes", if and only if the answer to the (n, n − 1) − Consensus Halving problem is "yes", i.e. there exists a (n − 1)-cut that satisfies n agents.
Suppose that there exists a solution X * := (X * 1 , . . . , X * N ) ∈ [0, 1] N of (15), which equivalently means that q 1 (X * ) = q 2 (X * ). Then, by the correct construction of our special circuit (following the procedure in Subsection 5.1) which uses r gates and computes q 1 and q 2 , there is a tuple holds from z * r−1 = z * r . Therefore f inis is satisfied. Also, the agents ad i , mid i , cen i , ex i for all i ∈ [r] are satisfied as argued in Appendix F, and the answer to (n, n − 1) − Consensus Halving is "yes", since we have 4r + 1 agents satisfied by 4r cuts.
Suppose now that there exists a 4r-cut (t * 1 , . . . , t * 4r ) with 0 ≤ t * 1 ≤ · · · ≤ t * 4r ≤ 12r that is a solution of the (n, n − 1)-Consensus Halving instance we constructed, where n := 4r + 1. As argued in Appendix F, if the ad i , mid i , cen i , ex i agents for i ∈ [r] are satisfied then each of cen i , ex i agents imposes a cut in interval v 
J Proof of Lemma 16
Proof. Since each agent i has a polynomial valuation function, there is a d ∈ O(log n) and constants a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a l such that each function F i can be written as F i (t) = d j=0 a j · t j . To prove the theorem, we will formulate the problem as an -ETR instance [20] , and apply Theorem 2 of [20] , which proves the claim. A problem Π belongs in -ETR, if it is the relaxation of a problem Π in ETR. More specifically, we get Π by allowing a discrepancy of > 0 in every constraint of Π. So, to get an instance in -ETR for Consensus Halving.
We first write a simple ETR formula for consensus halving with polynomial valuation functions. If a consensus halving instance has a solution, then it also has one in which the cuts are strictly alternating, meaning that
where the cut is the tuple (t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t n ), with 0 ≤ t 1 ≤ · · · ≤ t n ≤ 1 and t 0 := 0, t n+1 := 1.
In this encoding, we have no need to encode which set a particular cut belongs to, and so we can encode a n-cut as an element of the n-simplex x := (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n+1 ) ∈ ∆ n+1 , where x i := t i − t i−1 .
From the latter, it is easy to see that
For j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, let us denote by 1 j and 0 j a j-tuple of 1's and 0's respectively. Let us also define the n-dimensional vector v j := (0 j , 1 n−j ). Now observe that any n-cut t := (t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t n ) can be represented by a n-dimensional point which is in fact a convex combination of the n + 1 vectors v j , j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}. In particular, from (18) it is easy to see that t := (t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t n ) = n+1 j=1 x j · v j−1 .
Hence, we can encode the problem as an ETR formula
where C is the convex hull of the vectors v 0 , v 1 , . . . , v n . This formula has n constraints, one for each agent, and a single constraint bounding the variables in the convex set C which can be expressed by n + 1 vectors, namely v j , j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}.
The main theorem of [20] allows us to leave the constraint t ∈ C unchanged, but insists that we weaken the others. Specifically each constraint is weakened so that only F i (A + ) − F i (A − ) ≤ and F i (A + ) − F i (A − ) ≥ − are enforced, which implies that |F i (A + ) − F i (A − )| ≤ . This is sufficient to encode an approximate solution to the problem.
The constructed -ETR instance has one vector-variable t ∈ C and 2n constraints. Let us now study one of the constraints of the -ETR instance. Using the representation of F i , we can write down a constraint as d k=0 a k · h k (t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t n ) ≤ , where h k (t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t n ) is a sum of monomials, each one of degree d. F i depends on t 0 and t n+1 as well, but recall that these are 0 and 1 respectively.
According to the notation of [20] (see also the full version [21] for details), the term a k ·h k (t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t n ) is a simple tensor multivariate polynomial with one variable of degree k, denoted ST M (H k , t k ). Under this notation H k is a k-dimensional tensor where vector t is applied k times. Hence, every constraint is a sum of d + 1 simple tensor multivariate polynomials, i.e., according to [20] notation, a tensor multivariate polynomial of maximum degree d and length d + 1. Furthermore, ||v j || ∞ ≤ 1 for all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, and for every constraint, the maximum absolute coefficient is constant by definition, and the degree d is O(log n). Hence, we can apply Theorem 2 from [20] and get the claimed result.
